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Abstract
The United States is becoming more like Europe, and not in a good way. For a long time,
the central difference between antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe has been
that the United States features not only public enforcement, but a vigorous system of private antitrust enforcement, while in Europe, public agencies have had an effective monopoly on antitrust
enforcement. But that difference is on the verge of collapsing. We are achieving a form of convergence; but contrary to expectations, this convergence is not coming from recent European efforts to
facilitate private enforcement, which have not yet overcome some serious obstacles on discovery
and class actions. Instead, it is coming from the recent US Supreme Court decision in American
Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, which threatens to gut private antitrust enforcement in the
United States by replacing it with ineffective forms of arbitration.
KEYWORDS: International Arbitration, Arbitration, Italian Colors Restaurant, American Express, European Union, International Law, EU Directive, Antitrust Enforcement

ESSAY
HOW ITALIAN COLORS GUTS PRIVATE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT BY REPLACING IT
WITH INEFFECTIVE FORMS OF ARBITRATIONµ
Einer Elhauge*
The United States is becoming more like Europe, and not in a
good way. For a long time, the central difference between antitrust
enforcement in the United States and Europe has been that the United
States features not only public enforcement, but a vigorous system of
private antitrust enforcement, while in Europe, public agencies have
had an effective monopoly on antitrust enforcement. But that
difference is on the verge of collapsing. We are achieving a form of
convergence; but contrary to expectations, this convergence is not
coming from recent European efforts to facilitate private enforcement,
which have not yet overcome some serious obstacles on discovery
and class actions. Instead, it is coming from the recent US Supreme
Court decision in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant,1
which threatens to gut private antitrust enforcement in the United
States by replacing it with ineffective forms of arbitration.
Procedural differences explain the prior divergence between the
United States and Europe on private antitrust enforcement. After all,
private claims for violations of European competition law can and
have been brought, so it is not as if European law bans private
antitrust suits. However, limited discovery and the lack of class action
suits have generally meant that private suits are usually infeasible in
Europe. After all, nowadays you generally cannot prove antitrust
damages without proving market definition, market power, and the
economic effects of the conduct. Proving those elements requires
market data and economic experts to analyze it. But without
discovery, a private plaintiff cannot obtain the necessary data, and
µ This Essay was originally published in FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE,
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 2014 (Barry Hawk ed., 2015).
* Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. See Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) [hereinafter Italian
Colors].
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without class action mechanisms, a disparate group of market
participants cannot fund the expensive expert reports necessary to
analyze it. Thus, in Europe, the field of antitrust enforcement has
largely been left to public enforcers. The new EU Directive on
antitrust damages encourages European nations to provide more
private discovery and to allow at least opt-in class actions, but the
Directive does not yet mandate clear rules to solve these problems.2
Historically matters have been quite different in the United
States, which also effectively requires market data and economic
experts to prove antitrust damages, but instead allows liberal
discovery to collect that market data and class actions to fund the
economic experts. Or at least that was the law before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Italian Colors. In that case, the Supreme Court
considered “whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff's cost
of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the
potential recovery.”3 As Justice Kagan observed in dissent, “No
rational actor would bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars
if doing so meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands.”4
Accordingly, Justice Kagan and the Second Circuit concluded that the
contract provision waiving class arbitration fell afoul of the rule that
arbitration provisions should not be enforced when they prevent the
“effective vindication” of federal law.5
How, then, did the Supreme Court justify its conclusion that the
effective vindication of antitrust law was not thwarted by a provision
that required plaintiffs to proceed in an individual way that meant
costs would be at least ten times the possible recovery if the plaintiff
won? Its analysis boiled down to one thin paragraph, with two thinner
reasons.
First, in an effort to distinguish prior cases holding that
arbitration clauses could neither waive a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies nor impose arbitration fees that were too large to
make access practicable, the Supreme Court argued that those cases
involved the ability or expense necessary to “pursue” the statutory
2. Council Directive No. 0089/2014 (Sept. 4, 2014) on certain rules governing actions
for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the
Member States and of the European Union. 2014 O.J. L 349/1.
3. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2307.
4. Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
5. See id. at 2313-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting); In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d
300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2009).
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remedy, rather than “the expense involved in proving a statutory
remedy.”6 As the dissent pointed out, this amounted to simply saying
that the prior cases involved different facts; the whole point of having
a principle like “effective vindication” is that enforceability can be
gutted in a myriad of ways, so we need a general principle to deal
with all the variations.7 More fundamentally, there simply is no
meaningful difference between the right to pursue a claim and the
right to prove it, given that pursuing a claim necessarily requires
proving it to win. It is rather like saying you have the right to be
represented at trial by counsel, as long as your counsel does not
speak.
Second, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 1890 and 1914
Congresses that enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts could not
possibly have thought that class action procedure was necessary to
effectively vindicate federal antitrust rights because those Acts were
enacted decades before federal class actions were made possible by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.8 But the Court failed to grapple
with the simple fact that back then plaintiffs could and usually did
prove antitrust violations and damages without any economic rigor
and thus did not need an economics expert. That made individual lowstakes antitrust suits far more possible. Now that the courts have
interpreted federal antitrust law to require an economically rigorous
showing on market definition, power, and effects, antitrust claims
require an economics expert, precluding individual low-stakes suits
and thus requiring some sort of class procedure to share the costs.
The Court conceded that “the effective-vindication rule asks
about the world today, not the world as it might have looked when
Congress passed a given statute,” but the Court reasoned that “time
does not change the meaning of effectiveness, making ineffective
vindication today what was effective vindication in the past.”9
However, this reasoning is simply not responsive because the point is
that changes in the world require economic expert testimony to prove
a claim now but not then. This change demonstrates that under a
constant meaning of effectiveness, a procedure that does not allow
expert testimony makes vindication ineffective now, even though it
would not have made it ineffective back then when no expert
6.
7.
8.
9.

Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11.
Id. at 2317–18 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2311.
Id. at 2311 n.4.
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testimony was required to prove a claim. To put it another way, the
Congress that enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts intended to
create a right of private antitrust enforcement. That Congress might
have thought that right would be vindicated without class actions back
when little proof was required, and that Congress might have thought
that right could be vindicated when the courts required additional
expensive proof as long as class procedures that allowed that proof to
be funded. But that Congress could not have thought that right would
be vindicated if the courts both required additional expensive proof
and disallowed any class procedures necessary to fund it.
Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion actually offered a more
coherent rationale: that plaintiff’s voluntary consent to the arbitration
provision required enforcing that provision even if waived effective
or even literal enforcement of a statutory right.10 This consent
rationale raises an important challenge that I think explains a lot about
the Court’s whole attitude to arbitration clauses. If customers
voluntarily consent to an arbitration provision that guts an
enforcement right, can’t we conclude that those customers must have
thought that the enforcement right was worth less than whatever they
got in return in the contract negotiation? Wouldn’t preventing
enforcement of such provisions thus make customers worse off?
To address this challenge, it is best to begin by asking ourselves
a foundational question: why do we have antitrust laws at all? After
all, virtually all antitrust violations require the consent of the
defendant’s customers. If defendants enter into a cartel or merger that
raises prices, buyers could in theory defeat it by refusing to pay any
increase in prices. The cartel or merger works only because buyers
instead consent to those prices. If a monopolist uses predatory pricing,
tying, exclusive dealing, or other exclusionary conduct to exclude its
rivals and raise prices to consumers, those consumers could in theory
defeat the conduct by refusing to accept the predatorily-priced good,
the tying condition, or any other exclusive or exclusionary condition.
Exclusionary conduct works only if buyers consent to it. Thus, the
consent logic wrongly implies that all antitrust violations must benefit
the buyers who agree to them, precisely contrary to the purpose of
antitrust law, which is to protect consumer welfare.
The flaw in this consent logic is that buyers in markets have a
collective action problem. If buyers acted together, then they would
10. Id. at 2312–13 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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refuse to consent to conduct that harms them all. But acting
individually, each buyer has incentives to agree to inflated prices or
exclusionary conditions because they know that in a market with
many buyers, no individual buyer’s refusal to consent will affect the
market result, but an individual refusal to consent will affect whether
that buyer gets the good the buyer desires.11 The whole reason we
have antitrust laws is to provide a collective action solution, via
statute, to our collective action problem.
The same problem infects consents to arbitration clauses that
waive the right to effective vindication of antitrust law. If buyers
acted together, then they would only consent if those waivers made
them better off. But acting individually, each buyer has incentives to
consent in exchange for a trivial discount from the inflated marketwide prices that will result when all buyers consent to effectively
immunizing antitrust violations against them. It takes only a trivial
discount because each buyer knows that their individual decision
whether to consent has little effect on whether the market-wide harm
from immunizing antitrust violations occurs.
To put it another way, competitive markets are a public good,
from which each buyer in a market benefits, whether or not that buyer
contributes to the creation of that public good by rejecting conduct or
agreements that keep that market competitive. Thus, buyers inevitably
have incentives not to contribute; instead they will predictably
consent to conduct and arbitration waivers that result in
uncompetitive markets.
The future implications are alarming. Given the Italian Colors
decision, it is hard to see why all businesses would not at least insert
arbitration clauses into their contracts that preclude class arbitration.
Given the limited nature of discovery in arbitration, that alone will
bring US private enforcement largely into convergence with Europe,
and perhaps will leave US private enforcement even less effective
than the European Union in the future if the new EU directive leads to
stronger national rules on discovery and class actions.
Businesses are likely to go even further given the Supreme
Court’s logic that arbitration provisions are permissible whenever
11. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 456–57 (2009) (detailing this issue for the
sort of tying claim considered in the Italian Colors case); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better
Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 284–92 (2003) (detailing it for other
exclusionary conduct).
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they eliminate only the right to prove a claim, rather than the right to
pursue it. Under this logic, parties could adopt arbitration provisions
eliminating the ability to introduce economic expert testimony
altogether, even though that would effectively preclude not only class
suits but also suits by corporate plaintiffs that might have large
enough stakes to fund an expert. The Court offered two responses to
this possibility. First, it said, “it is not a given that such a clause
would constitute an impermissible waiver,”12 which alarmingly
suggests this possibility might well be in our future. Second, the
Court said that this possibility would be different because “such a
clause, assuming it makes vindication of the claim impossible, makes
it impossible not just as a class action but even as an individual
claim.”13 But that rationale conflicts with the Court’s logic that the
difference is between being able to pursue a claim and prove it, and
disturbingly suggests the Court is resting instead on a hostility to class
actions over corporate suits.
Moreover, the Court’s logic would also seem to permit many
other possible ways of gutting antitrust enforcement that the Court did
not address. Parties could adopt provisions that preclude discovery
even more than it is already limited in arbitration, say by barring any
discovery into market definition, power, or anticompetitive effects.
Indeed, the Court’s distinction between barring proof versus barring
pursuit of a claim would even suggest that arbitration clauses could
baldly prohibit offering any proof in arbitration on market definition,
power, or anticompetitive effects, because that would go simply to the
right to prove the claim. This would leave private enforcement by US
buyers even less effective than in Europe.
This development would immunize businesses against US
federal antitrust enforcement by anyone who contracts with them,
which is almost any private party who can sue given that federal
antitrust law largely limits antitrust enforcement to direct purchasers.
The main exception would be antitrust suits by rivals excluded by
exclusionary conduct, who may have no contract with the defendant
and thus no arbitration provision. But that is hardly an adequate
substitute because:
[A]ny rival claim will be limited to the competitive profits the
rival could have earned on some share of the market in the but12. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 n.3.
13. Id.
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for world. A monopolist will generally find it profitable to pay
such low competitive profits on a smaller market share out of the
monopoly profits it gains on its monopoly market share.14

Further, “it is too easy to cut side deals with rivals through
settlements that may satisfy the financial interests of the rivals but fail
to fix (or even worsen) the anticompetitive problem.”15 Indeed, the
Italian Colors decision creates incentives for them to cut side deals
that include arbitration provisions that bar effective antitrust
enforcement between them. And given that the Italian Colors
decision allows each business to use arbitration clauses that
effectively immunize them against their buyers, businesses might not
have much incentive to even try to exclude each other since it is more
profitable to instead collude and jointly exploit their buyers.

14. Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement As an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 85
(2009).
15. Id.
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